

The Social Awareness Inventory: Development and Applications

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The Social Awareness Inventory (SAI), which assesses individual differences in eight social-perceptual styles, is introduced and applied in three studies. The model is derived by crossing the three binary dimensions of target (self or other), perspective (own or other's), and content (overt appearance or covert experience). Studies 1 and 2 describe the development of the SAI and show that its subscales are meaningfully associated with related constructs such as public and private self-consciousness, empathy, social anxiety, and narcissism. Studies 2 and 3 explore the factor structure of the SAI, showing that people high on a self-divided factor regulate themselves according to environmental controls, list more self-presentational strivings, and are higher on neuroticism and depression. In contrast, people high on a self-grounded factor tend to be autonomy oriented. The SAI appears to provide an integrative conceptual and empirical framework for considering many personality and motivational constructs.

Social awarenesses, broadly defined, are mental events in which one forms a mental representation of either oneself or another person (Wegner & Giuliano, 1982). Many personality constructs are characterizable in social awareness terms. For example, public and private self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), social anxiety (Leary, Kowalski, & Campbell, 1988), narcissism (Buss & Chiodo, 1991; Miller, 1981), and depressive self-focusing style (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) all seem to involve dispositional self-awareness. In contrast, constructs such as emotional (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) and cognitive empathy (Davis, 1980), social acuity (Funder & Harris, 1986), and social sensitivity (Riggio, Tucker, & Coffaro, 1989) can all be considered forms of dispositional other-awareness. This article presents a differentiated model of social awareness forms and an associated personality inventory. The model offers a context in which to examine social-cognitive commonalities and differences underlying a wide variety of personality variables.

One reason such a model may be timely is that there is confusion regarding many existing social awareness-related constructs. First, traits conceived of as unitary are often measured with scales that are empirically bidimensional (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Carver, 1989; Dillard & Hunter, 1989). As just one example, the popular Private Self-Consciousness Scale appears to be composed of both a Self-Reflectiveness factor and an Internal State Awareness factor (Burnkrant & Page, 1984; Mittal & Balasubramanian, 1987; Piliavin & Charng, 1988). The items that load on the Self-Reflectiveness factor seem to imply "standing at a distance" from oneself, and the factor has been linked to measures of identity seeking and low self-esteem. In contrast, the Internal State Awareness items imply a state of self-congruence, and the factor has been shown to be negatively related to identity seeking (Piliavin & Charng, 1988). There is increasing recognition that results obtained with such factorially dual scales can be quite difficult to interpret (Carver, 1989; Hull, Lehn, & Tedlie, 1991).

Confusion is also created by the poorly understood conceptual duality that many social awareness constructs seem to have. For example, although private and public self-consciousness both imply focal awareness of the self, they seem to differ in the perspective that is taken on the self (internal vs. external) or in the aspect of self focused on (private experience vs. physical appearance). This ambiguity has caused great contention (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1987; Fenigstein, 1987; Gollwitzer & Wicklund,

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1987).¹ The framework outlined below is intended, in part, to help shed new light on such issues.

THE MODEL

Assumptions of the Model

The term *social awareness*, herein, will refer to a contextualized cognizance either of oneself or of another person. Social awarenesses present person-perceptual information that is of potential relevance to one's social objectives. For example, to influence another person, one might pay particular attention to how one appears to that person so that one can adjust one's social performance as necessary (Goffman, 1959; Sheldon & Johnson, 1993). This functional understanding is consistent with cybernetic models of self-regulation (Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1990; Hyland, 1988; Mithaug, 1993), in which moments of awareness allow situational information to be evaluated in terms of goals or reference standards so that discrepancies can be identified and reduced. Thus social awarenesses may be seen as essential for social self-regulation.

Another assumption of this research is that people have enduring habits or styles of attending to social information. These social awareness dispositions are conceived of as cognitive (rather than affective or behavioral) traits (Emmons, 1989b). A final assumption is that social awareness dispositions derive from chronic social goals and motives (Franzoi, Davis, & Markweise, 1990) and reflect the enduring informational needs generated by such motives. For example, people who habitually "put themselves in others' shoes" may do so because of a strong need for intimacy (McAdams, 1985; Sheldon & Johnson, 1993). By constructing such empathic awarenesses, they ongoingly acquire information that helps them to bridge the gap between themselves and others.²

Dimensions of the Model

In light of the conceptual dualities noted above, it is intriguing that in Carver and Scheier's (1981, 1982) model of attention, awarenesses have a twofold nature. That is, they involve a representation of one's current state or behavior, matched to some standard or criterion. Generalized, this implies that awarenesses consist of both an *object* of attention and an evaluative *context* in which that object is framed. This idea converges with a model of social awareness proposed by Wegner and Giuliano (1982, 1983), who suggested that awarenesses have both a "focal" and a "tacit" dimension. The focus (or target) of an awareness is what it is explicitly about, whereas the tacit aspect of an awareness concerns the

implicit perspective or vantage point from which the target appears. Wegner and Giuliano's (1982) model identified four basic forms of dyadic social awareness by specifying that either self or other can provide the tacit standpoint from which either self or other is focalized. For clarity, the focal and tacit dimensions will henceforth be referred to as the *target* and the *perspective* of an awareness.

Going beyond the target and perspective dimensions, Figurski (1987) identified a third, *content*-based dimension of social awareness. He observed that one may be aware of either how the target appears (this includes physical characteristics and overt behavior) or what the target is experiencing (i.e., thinking and/or feeling).³ Crossing the target, perspective, and content dimensions would yield a taxonomy consisting of eight basic awareness forms. However, Figurski (1987) recognized only four forms in his model by assuming that a given person's perspective, once taken, allows *privileged* access to that person's experience or to another's appearance and no access to that person's appearance or to another's experience. Thus Figurski's model specifies that one can be aware of (a) self experience/from the self perspective (as may occur when we attempt to understand our own anger), (b) self appearance/from the other's perspective (as may occur when we appear in public in a new bathing suit), (c) the other's experience/from the other's perspective (as may occur when we "feel for another person"), or (d) the other's appearance/from the self perspective (as may occur when we laugh at someone's necktie). Figurski's (1987) assumption excludes the possibility that one might experience *nonprivileged* awareness of (e) self appearance/from the self perspective (as may occur when anorexics insist they are too fat, despite others' protests), (f) self experience/from the other's perspective (as may occur when we visit a therapist), (g) the other's experience/from the self perspective (as may occur when we deny another's right to feel insulted), or (h) the other's appearance/from the other's perspective (as may occur when we notice a teenager's obsession with his or her complexion).

To show that a full crossing of the target, perspective, and content dimensions is warranted, Sheldon and Johnson (1993) created definitional statements for the eight forms of social awareness described above and asked participants to estimate how often they experience each awareness form. They found that people do report experiencing the four nonprivileged awareness forms, but less frequently than the corresponding privileged forms. In two studies, this effect took the form of a highly significant three-way interaction between the within-subject factors of target, content, and perspective as predictors of awareness frequency.

Consistent with the assumption that social awareness dispositions derive from underlying social motives, Sheldon and Johnson (1993) also showed that people high in intimacy motivation and nurturance needs make more frequent use of others' perspectives in viewing others' experiences, whereas persons high in power motivation and dominance needs tend to retain their own perspective on others' experiences. People high in power motivation also tend to pay more attention to self appearance than to self experience.

The Current Research

Following Sheldon and Johnson (1993), an eight-cell taxonomy was adopted. The model presented in Table 1 specifies that during a particular moment of social awareness one attends to either the *appearance* or the *experience* of either *self* or *other*, from either one's *own* or the *other's* psychological perspective. Study 1 presents scales to assess individual differences in the tendency to use these eight awareness forms, examines the factor structure of the eight scales, and provides preliminary validation evidence by examining their relationship to two existing social awareness constructs, private and public self-consciousness. Study 2 shows that the social awareness framework can be applied to consider other trait constructs, such as empathy, narcissism, and social anxiety, and also examines the relationship of the Social Awareness Inventory's (SAI) two factors to neuroticism and depression. Study 3 uses self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985b, 1991) to further develop the idea that social awareness dispositions relate to specific motivational or self-regulatory styles.

STUDY 1

Overview and Hypotheses

Participants responded to a pool of candidate items, from which eight internally consistent subscales were derived. In addition, they completed the Public and Private Self-Consciousness Scales (Fenigstein et al., 1975).

In accordance with the ideas that people high in private self-consciousness attend to their inner thoughts and feelings (Fenigstein et al., 1975) and are motivated primarily by a desire for self-knowledge (Franzoi et al., 1990), it was expected that the Private Self-Consciousness Scale would be strongly correlated with the tendency to be aware of "self experience/from the self perspective."

However, as noted above, the Private Self-Consciousness Scale has been shown to consist of both an "internal state awareness" and a "self-reflectiveness" factor (Burnkrant & Page, 1984; Mittal & Balasubramanian, 1987; Piliavin & Charng, 1988). One goal of the study was to examine these two factors in terms of the present social awareness model. Because the self-reflectiveness factor has been

related to identity seeking (Piliavin & Charng, 1988), I hypothesized that people scoring high on it should be significantly more likely to take others' perspectives on their private experience than people high in internal state awareness. One way of seeking identity, presumably, is to frequently consider what others would say about one's own thoughts and feelings. This hypothesis, which involves the awareness form numbered 2 in Table 1, was to be examined by means of a *t* test of the difference between correlations (Cohen & Cohen, 1983).

Public self-consciousness is defined as a disposition to be aware of oneself as a social object (Fenigstein et al., 1975). This definition suggested that public self-consciousness should be strongly correlated with both awareness forms in which one pays attention to one's external appearance (i.e., "self appearance/from the self perspective" and also "self appearance/from the other's perspective"). That is, public self-consciousness may consist of a general tendency to consider how one looks, from any available point of view.

Method

Descriptive definitions of all eight awareness forms were provided to two advanced undergraduate assistants. Descriptions were the same as those used in previous research (Sheldon & Johnson, 1993). For example, a descriptive definition that exemplifies other-awareness, other-perspective, and appearance awareness is "I tend to pay attention to the appearance and behavior of other people, and I tend to think about them from the other's point of view."

The assistants wrote items to fit the eight categories. From these a pool of 20 candidate items was selected for each of the eight categories (included in each pool was the descriptive definition for that category). All items were worded straightforwardly, without reversals. This was done because most of the items were already somewhat complex, referring to both a target figure and a perspective taken on that figure. A primary goal of Study 1 was to identify eight subscales with alpha coefficients of at least .70.

A questionnaire packet was created, in which the 160 items were arranged in a recurring order such that every ninth item began a repetition of the cycle. Following these 160 items were the Public and Private Self-Consciousness subscales (17 items). The response options for all items were *very uncharacteristic of me*, *somewhat uncharacteristic of me*, *somewhat characteristic of me*, and *very characteristic of me*. In addition to a public and private self-consciousness score, each subject received scores for the two factors underlying the Private Self-Consciousness Scale (Piliavin & Charng, 1988).⁴

Participants were 306 undergraduates at the University of California, Davis, who participated for class credit.

TABLE 1: Eight Forms of Social Awareness: Descriptions and Example Items

Content	Self as Target		Other as Target	
	Self Perspective	Other's Perspective	Self Perspective	Other's Perspective
Experience	(1)	(2)	(5)	(6)
	Self experience/from self perspective	Self experience/from other's perspective	Other's experience/from self perspective	Other's experience/from other's perspective
	(Privileged)	(Nonprivileged)	(Privileged)	(Nonprivileged)
	"When something upsets me, I think a lot about why I got upset."	"Sometimes I don't know what I'm feeling until somebody tells me."	"It is usually easy for me to figure out why others feel the way they do."	"More than most, I put myself in another's shoes."
Appearance	(3)	(4)	(7)	(8)
	Self appearance/from self perspective	Self appearance/from other's perspective	Other's appearance/from self perspective	Other's appearance/from other's perspective
	(Privileged)	(Nonprivileged)	(Privileged)	(Nonprivileged)
	"I like looking at myself when I know I look good."	"I like to know how I look to others."	"When people lie to me, I often catch them, because their voice and eyes give them away."	"I can usually pick up the fact that a person is pleased about the way he/she looks."

The materials were administered in group sessions. Three participants did not answer all the questions and were eliminated from subsequent analyses. The final sample of 303 consisted of 122 men and 181 women.

Results

Initial analyses focused on identifying, for each of the eight awareness forms, the single most internally consistent 8-item set. After repeated reliability analyses, 64 items were identified and retained. All subscales demonstrated internal consistency exceeding the goal of .70, except the subscale assessing awareness of "other's experience/from the self perspective" ($\alpha = .68$). No retained item correlated more strongly with another subscale than with its own. Each subject was then assigned a score on each of the awareness forms by summing responses across the 8 retained items within each subscale. Table 2 gives alpha coefficients for each subscale and also presents the intercorrelations of the eight subscales.

As can be seen, there were substantial associations between subscales. To clarify these, a principal components analysis of the eight subscale scores was performed. In this analysis a large first component (42% of the variance) emerged, on which every subscale loaded .45 or higher (unrotated). One other component also emerged, which explained 22% of the variance. Table 3 presents the rotated loadings of the eight subscales on the two factors for all three studies reported herein. The oblique solution is presented because the eight awareness dispositions are not assumed to be orthogonal to

one another (however, orthogonal rotations yielded very similar solutions). Five subscales loaded .60 or more on the first factor: the four awareness forms in which the other is target and also the "self experience/from the self perspective" form. The other three scales loaded .80 or more on the second factor: "self appearance/from the other's perspective," "self experience/from the other's perspective," and "self appearance/from the self perspective." Table 3 shows that there was virtually no cross-loading. However, the two oblique factors were moderately correlated ($r = .26$). For reasons to be discussed below, the two SAI factors were given the labels Self-Grounded and Self-Divided.

Overall, the most strongly endorsed awareness form was "self experience/from the self perspective" ($M = 24.6$), followed by "other's appearance/from the self perspective" ($M = 24.1$).⁵ Paired-sample t tests revealed that these two means differed from the other six means but did not differ from each other. These two awareness forms were also rated as most frequently experienced in earlier research (Sheldon & Johnson, 1993); the ordering comports with social-cognitive findings by Johnson (1987), Johnson, Struthers, and Bradlee (1988), and Prentice (1990) showing that people define themselves mostly in terms of their own thoughts and feelings and think of others mostly in terms of overt appearance or behavior.

A multivariate analysis of variance on the eight subscale scores with target, perspective, and content as two-level within-subject factors revealed a highly significant three-way interaction between the three factors,

TABLE 2: The Eight Subscales of the Social Awareness Inventory: Intercorrelations and Alpha Coefficients

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Self experience/self perspective	.83							
2. Self experience/other's perspective	.09	.82						
3. Self appearance/self perspective	.25	.47	.77					
4. Self appearance/other's perspective	.20	.65	.72	.85				
5. Other's experience/self perspective	.42	.11	.24	.24	.68			
6. Other's experience/other's perspective	.45	.09	.11	.13	.42	.88		
7. Other's appearance/self perspective	.36	.13	.33	.30	.64	.25	.79	
8. Other's appearance/other's perspective	.37	.08	.25	.24	.64	.30	.67	.80

NOTE: Alpha coefficients are given on the diagonal. For correlations greater than .11, $p < .05$; for correlations greater than .14, $p < .01$.

TABLE 3: Factor Pattern Matrix for the Eight Subscale Scores (oblique rotation), Studies 1, 2, and 3

Subscale	Study 1 (N = 303)		Study 2 (N = 261)		Study 3 (N = 167)	
	"Self-Grounded" Factor	"Self-Divided" Factor	"Self-Grounded" Factor	"Self-Divided" Factor	"Self-Grounded" Factor	"Self-Divided" Factor
Self experience/self perspective	.66	.03	.58	.09	.76	-.12
Other's experience/other's perspective	.61	-.07	.66	-.09	.78	-.08
Other's appearance/other's perspective	.82	.00	.82	-.02	.78	.14
Other's experience/self perspective	.77	.10	.78	-.10	.74	.24
Other's experience/other's perspective	.85	-.01	.83	-.02	.85	.01
Self experience/other's perspective	-.12	.85	-.10	.88	-.15	.79
Self appearance/other's perspective	.06	.90	.06	.91	.11	.88
Self appearance/self perspective	.11	.81	.09	.85	.17	.78
Factor intercorrelation	.26		.31		.29	

$F(1, 302) = 123.24, p < .001$. That is, participants tended to receive higher scores on the four privileged awareness forms than on the corresponding nonprivileged awareness forms. This finding also replicates the effects found in earlier studies (Sheldon & Johnson, 1993).⁶

Table 4 presents the correlations of the eight awareness forms with the Public and Private Self-Consciousness Scales and with the Internal State Awareness and Self-Reflectiveness factors of the Private Self-Consciousness Scale. Private self-consciousness was strongly correlated with the tendency to be aware of "self experience/from the self perspective," as expected ($r = .71$). Private self-consciousness was also significantly correlated with the other seven subscales (none of these other correlations exceeded .40). The hypothesis that the "self experience/from the other's perspective" subscale would differentiate the Internal State Awareness and Self-Reflectiveness factors of the Private Self-Consciousness Scale was supported by t tests of the difference between correlations ($r_s = -.04$ vs. $.35$) $t = 6.48, p < .01$.

Public self-consciousness was strongly associated with the two subscales involving a focus on self appearance, as expected ($r_s = .71$ and $.75$). However, it also correlated significantly with the other six SAI subscales (none of these correlations exceeded .49). Although

the predicted associations of SAI subscales with self-consciousness scales were all significantly stronger than nonpredicted ones, it is apparent that the SAI subscales are not as discriminating as might be desired.

Discussion

Results for the scale-development phase of the study were encouraging. Seven of the subscales demonstrated good internal consistency, and the eighth showed a reliability that many would consider adequate. The subscales were also meaningfully associated with public and private self-consciousness, providing preliminary evidence for their construct validity. In addition, the "self experience/from the other's perspective" subscale showed that it could distinguish between the two factors of the Private Self-Consciousness Scale, casting new light on this ongoing controversy. Further validation for the SAI was provided by the fact that the ordering of the two largest subscale means, and the highly significant three-way interaction between the three binary awareness dimensions, replicated the results of Sheldon and Johnson (1998).

The two factors that emerged in the SAI nicely parallel the basic distinction between objective and subjective self-awareness proposed by Duvall and Wicklund (1972).

TABLE 4: Correlations Between the eight Subscales of the Social Awareness Inventory and Self-Consciousness Variables, Study 1

	Self Exp/ Self Psp	Self Exp/ Other's Psp	Self App/ Self Psp	Self App/ Other's Psp	Other's Exp/ Self Psp	Other's Exp/ Other's Psp	Other's App/ Self Psp	Other's App/ Other's Psp
Private self-consciousness	.71	.23	.40	.37	.28	.34	.36	.30
Self-Reflectiveness	.45	.35	.41	.43	.27	.26	.31	.23
Internal State Awareness	.62	-.04	.22	.13	.35	.34	.38	.40
Public self-consciousness	.30	.49	.71	.75	.16	.18	.27	.23

NOTE: Exp = experience; psp = perspective; app = appearance. For correlations greater than .11, $p < .05$; for correlations greater than .14, $p < .01$.

Duvall and Wicklund defined objective self-awareness as a state in which a person is "the object of his own consciousness." The three subscales that load on the second SAI factor (self experience and self appearance/ from the other's perspective; self appearance/ from the self perspective) imply such states because they assess habitual awareness of self as an appearing object as seen from an external vantage point, or both. In contrast, Duvall and Wicklund defined subjective self-awareness as occurring when a person is the subject of awarenesses that are directed toward the external world. Consistent with this definition, four of the five awareness forms that load on the SAI's first factor assess focal awareness of others. Notably, however, the disposition to be aware of "self experience/ from the self perspective" also loaded on the first SAI factor. This implies that not all focal self-awareness forms "objectify" the self—only those in which self is viewed as an appearing object, from an external vantage point, or both.

Duvall and Wicklund (1972) never developed individual difference measures of their two concepts. However, the general consistency of the SAI's factor structure with their model suggests that the two SAI factors might serve in this capacity and therefore might be labeled *subjective self-awareness* and *objective self-awareness*. Although the latter term would be satisfactory, the former term is potentially misleading, because four of the five scales loading on this factor involve focal other-awareness, not focal self-awareness. I propose that the two SAI factors be called *self-grounded* and *self-divided*. The five awareness forms loading on the first factor all seem to involve secure contact with the interests of a "situated" self. In contrast, the three awareness forms loading on the second factor entail habitual evaluation of the self from an externalizing stance. This habit of "standing outside oneself" may reflect a person's insecurity or self-alienation (Broughton, 1981; Laing, 1969).

STUDY 2

Overview and Hypotheses

In Study 2, the replicability of the reliability coefficients and factor structure of the eight subscales were

tested, as well as the replicability of relations with public and private self-consciousness. New candidate items for the "other's experience/ from the self perspective" subscale, whose alpha coefficient of .68 in Study 1 did not meet the goal of .70, were piloted. In addition, relations of the SAI subscales to several other social awareness-related constructs (social anxiety, cognitive and emotional empathy, and narcissism) were examined. Finally, correlations of the two SAI factors with measures of neuroticism and depression were scrutinized.

Associations of the SAI subscales with the Public and Private Self-Consciousness Scales were expected to replicate. In addition, it seemed reasonable that the Social Anxiety Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975; not administered in Study 1) would be related to the two self-target/ other's perspective awareness forms. That is, people who are socially anxious may be generally sensitive to others' perspectives on themselves, regardless of whether self experience or self appearance is focalized from that point of view. This follows from the distinction made by Fenigstein et al. (1975) between public self-consciousness and social anxiety, in which public self-consciousness is understood as awareness of oneself as a social object whereas social anxiety arises when the self is felt to be *evaluated*, presumably from another person's perspective.

Empathy has been viewed in two ways: as an ability to take the cognitive position of others or as an emotional resonance with others (Davis, 1983; Long & Andrews, 1990). One goal for Study 2 was to examine, in terms of the SAI, what these two different conceptions of empathy may have in common. That is, What social information-processing dispositions are shared by the two constructs?

One potential commonality is that concern for other people's thoughts (cognitive empathy) and concern for others' feelings (emotional empathy) both involve an orientation toward "other's experiences/ as seen from the other's perspective." Consequently, it was expected that both forms of empathy would be related to this SAI subscale. A second commonality is suggested by Rogers's (1980) claim that effective empathy requires self-congruence. In other words, the ability to locate and evaluate one's own deeper experience may be a precondition

to accurate empathizing with another. It was therefore hypothesized that both emotional and cognitive empathy would be related to tendencies to be aware of "self experience/from the self perspective." That is, the two varieties of empathy may have in common a general sensitivity to subjective experience (no matter whose), as seen from the experienter's perspective.

Additionally, I hypothesized that a measure of narcissism (Raskin & Terry, 1988) should be related to awareness of "self appearance/from the self perspective," because narcissists are self-absorbed (Emmons, 1987) and vain (Raskin & Terry, 1988). This prediction also accords with the prototypic story of Narcissus, who was lost in contemplation of his own image.

Participants in Study 2 also completed two measures of well-being: the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) and the EPQ Neuroticism scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). A growing body of research demonstrates that dispositional self-focus is associated with global negative affect (Wood, Saltzberg, Neale, Stone, & Rachmiel, 1990) and depression (Ingram, 1990; Pyszczynski, Hamilton, & Herring, 1989). However, perhaps not all focal self-awareness forms are problematic, only those forms in which the self is objectified (Duvall & Wicklund, 1972). Accordingly, I hypothesized that persons high in depression and neuroticism would tend to employ the three awareness forms loading on the Self-Divided factor, in which the self is cast as an appearing object, is seen from an external vantage point, or both; however, depression and neuroticism would *not* be associated with the disposition to focus on "self experience/from the self perspective" (nor would depression and neuroticism be associated with the other four self-grounded awareness forms). Composite scores for the two SAI factors were specially created to further examine these hypotheses.

Method

Participants were 284 undergraduates at the University of California, Davis, who received extra credit in psychology classes. These participants were tested in group sessions conducted over a 3-week period. There were two test forms (described below), which were given during alternate sessions. Twenty-three participants were eliminated because of missing data, leaving a combined sample size of 261.

The 64 retained items from Study 1 were again arranged in a recurring order such that every ninth item began a repetition of the cycle. Following these came 6 new candidate items for the "other's experience/from the self perspective" subscale. After these 70 items, the two test forms diverged. One hundred and forty participants completed the 33-item Emotional Empathy Questionnaire (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972), followed by the

7-item perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), followed by the full 23-item Self-Consciousness Scale (Fenigstein et al., 1975). Items in all three of these instruments were given with 4-point response options. Finally, these 140 participants completed the 40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988), using its true-false format.

After completing the SAI, the other 121 participants completed the 20-item CES-D (Radloff, 1977). Participants indicated whether they had experienced a variety of depressive symptoms "rarely," "some of the time," "a moderate amount of the time," or "most of the time," during the past week. These participants also completed the 23-item EPQ Neuroticism scale (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), given with a true-false format. After appropriate recodings, depression and neuroticism scores were computed for these 121 participants. Self-divided and self-grounded composite scores were also computed for these participants by summing the subscales that load on each factor.

Results

The reliabilities of the seven subscales that were left unaltered from Study 1 were examined first. All 261 participants were used for these analyses. These seven alpha coefficients were again adequate (all above .70). Alpha for the 8-item set constituting the original "other's experience/from the self perspective" subscale was .66. Reliability analyses of these 8 original items and the 6 new candidate items together led to an improved 8-item set ($\alpha = .71$) in which 2 items from Study 1 were replaced by new items. The final item set is given in the appendix; the ensuing Results and Discussion refer to this set.

The pattern of intercorrelations of the eight SAI subscales was very similar to that found in Table 2. When the eight scores were factor-analyzed together, a two-component pattern again emerged (see Table 3). After oblique rotation, the Self-Grounded factor was loaded on by the same five subscales as in Study 1 (all loadings > .58), and the Self-Divided factor was again loaded on by the two "self appearance" subscales and also by the "self experience/from the other's perspective" subscale (all loadings > .85). As in Study 1, there was almost no cross-loading. Thus the creation of composite scores for the Self-Divided and Self-Grounded factors seemed justified.

Again replicating Sheldon and Johnson's (1993) results, the "self experience/from the self perspective" and the "other's appearance/from the self perspective" subscales had the highest means, and the pattern of means was influenced by a strong three-way interaction (the privileged/nonprivileged effect) between the three

TABLE 5: Correlations of the Eight Subscales of the Social Awareness Inventory With Other Social Awareness-Related Constructs and With Well-Being Variables, Study 2

	<i>Self-Divided Awareness Forms</i>							
	<i>Self Exp/ Self Psp</i>	<i>Self Exp/ Other's Psp</i>	<i>Self App/ Self Psp</i>	<i>Self App/ Other's Psp</i>	<i>Other's Exp/ Self Psp</i>	<i>Other's Exp/ Other's Psp</i>	<i>Other's App/ Self Psp</i>	<i>Other's App/ Other's Psp</i>
Social Awareness Related Constructs								
Private self-consciousness	.68	.14	.33	.32	.30	.24	.22	.24
Self-Reflectiveness	.58	.32	.38	.40	.22	.17	.12	.13
Internal State Awareness	.58	-.16	.15	.10	.32	.26	.29	.31
Public self-consciousness	.22	.41	.61	.67	.09	-.04	.10	.08
Social anxiety	-.11	.43	.24	.33	-.06	-.16	-.20	-.21
Emotional empathy	.28	.14	.17	.18	.08	.39	.02	.07
Cognitive empathy	.44	-.14	-.15	-.04	.31	.46	.20	.31
Narcissism	.20	.03	.32	.22	.18	.14	.25	.25
Well-Being Variables								
Depression	.02	.34	.34	.36	.07	.10	-.03	-.04
Neuroticism	.23	.42	.42	.50	.22	.13	.13	.11

NOTE: Exp = experience; psp = perspective; app = appearance. For correlations involving social awareness—related constructs: r greater than .16, $p < .05$; r greater than .22, $p < .01$. For correlations involving well-being variables: r greater than .18, $p < .05$; r greater than .24, $p < .01$.

dimensions of target, perspective, and content, $F(1, 260) = 312.9$, $p < .001$.

As shown in Table 5, private self-consciousness again correlated strongly with awareness of "self experience/from the self perspective" ($r = .68$); in this sample, its largest association with another awareness form was .33. As in Study 1, the two factors of the Private Self-Consciousness Scale diverged in relation to the "self experience/from the other's perspective" subscale, $t = 5.69$, $p < .01$. That is, the Self-Reflectiveness factor of private self-consciousness was significantly positively correlated with the tendency to view "self experience/from the other's perspective" ($r = .32$), whereas the Internal State Awareness factor was significantly *negatively* correlated with this SAI subscale ($r = -.16$).

The strong relationship of public self-consciousness to the two self-appearance awareness forms was replicated ($r_s = .61$ and $.67$, respectively); in this sample, public self-consciousness was unrelated to the four other-target awareness forms. As suggested by Fenigstein and associates' (1975) definition, social anxiety was correlated with the two self-target forms in which the self is viewed from an external perspective (i.e., self experience/from the other's perspective, $r = .43$, and self appearance/from the other's perspective, $r = .33$).

Both the emotional empathy scale (Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972) and the perspective-taking scale of the IRI (cognitive empathy; Davis, 1980, 1983) were, as expected, related to awareness of "other's experience/from the other's perspective" ($r_s = .39$ and $.46$, respectively). Furthermore, in accordance with the idea that empathy requires contact with one's own experience as

well as the other's, both emotional and cognitive empathy were significantly correlated with the tendency to be aware of "self experience/from the self perspective" ($r_s = .28$ and $.44$, respectively). These four results support the suggestion that cognitive and emotional empathys share a propensity to pay attention to subjective experience, as viewed from the perspective of the experiencer. Finally, narcissism (Raskin & Terry, 1988) was significantly correlated with the "self appearance/from the self perspective" awareness form, as supposed ($r = .32$).

It is worth noting that cognitive empathy, social anxiety, and narcissism, like private and public self-consciousness, in some cases correlated with nonpredicted SAI subscales as well as the predicted ones. The discriminant validity question will be addressed in the General Discussion.

Table 5 also reports associations between the eight subscales and well-being variables. Both neuroticism and depression were significantly positively correlated with the three subscales loading on the Self-Divided factor. Contrary to prediction, neuroticism was also significantly associated with the tendency to be aware of "self experience/from the self perspective" ($r = .23$). Turning to the two SAI composite scores, depression and neuroticism were both associated with self-division ($r_s = .39$ and $.50$, respectively); depression was not associated with self-groundedness ($r = .03$), but neuroticism was ($r = .22$). The latter, unexpected result may reflect the fact that the self-grounded and self-divided scores are associated with each other; it may be that the self-divided variance drives the unexpected association. Supporting this interpretation, the correlation between self-groundedness and

neuroticism diminished from .22 to $-.01$ when self-division was partialled out of the relationship.

Discussion

Study 2 demonstrates that the reliabilities of the eight SAI subscales, as well as their intercorrelations, factor structure, and patterns of means, are replicable. Study 2 also provides further validation evidence for the SAI by replicating Self-Consciousness Scale relations from Study 1 and by showing that the subscales are predictably associated with social anxiety, emotional and cognitive empathy, and narcissism. In addition, Study 2 shows that "self-division" is significantly related to neuroticism and depression, consistent with the idea that objective self-awareness (Duvall & Wicklund, 1972) is aversive.

If self-divided awareness forms are unpleasant, why do people use them? Study 3 explores the proposal that self-divided people are inclined to look to external controls and standards (Deci & Ryan, 1985a, 1985b) for self-regulatory information, whereas self-grounded people are inclined to look to internal sources for self-regulatory information. As a parallel test of this idea, Study 3 also examines whether people high on self-divided subscales report more self-presentational "personal strivings" (Emmons, 1986, 1989a).

STUDY 3

Overview and Hypotheses

Deci and Ryan's General Causality Orientations Scale (GCOS; 1985a) distinguishes among autonomous, controlled, and impersonal motivational orientations. People who are predominantly autonomy oriented experience a high degree of choice in the initiation and regulation of behavior. They try to act on self-endorsed values and tend to see events as sources of information rather than as sources of pressure or compulsion. In contrast, control-oriented people are sensitive to, and even seek out, environmental constraints; they use such constraints as guides to organize and regulate their behavior. Although they may be quite competent, they are less likely to experience their behavior as freely chosen. Finally, people who are predominantly impersonally oriented often experience their own behavior as being beyond their intentional control. They tend to have neither a sense of competence nor a sense of choice and to experience a wide range of events as amotivating. Deci and Ryan (1985a) showed that autonomy orientation was related to ego development and self-esteem, whereas impersonal orientation was negatively related to these constructs. Impersonal orientation was also related to depression, and control orientation was shown to be related to the Type A behavior pattern. Since its introduction, the GCOS has been profitably employed by

many investigators (e.g., Koestner, Bernieri, & Zuckerman, 1992; Strauss & Ryan, 1987; Zuckerman, Giosso, & Tellini, 1988).

Recall that the social-perceptual dispositions assessed by the SAI were assumed to reflect enduring informational needs that arise from underlying motivational orientations. The GCOS provides one context in which to examine this claim. The idea that autonomy-oriented persons look to internal sources for self-regulatory information whereas control-oriented people look to external constraints nicely parallels the distinction between the Self-Grounded and Self-Divided factors of the SAI. That is, autonomy-oriented people may tend to contextualize social information in ways that conduce to feelings of grounded and choiceful selfhood. In contrast, people oriented toward controlling environmental constraints may frequently objectify or "divide" themselves as they evaluate and regulate themselves using perceived external standards.

In accordance with these ideas, it was hypothesized that the three self-divided subscales would be associated with the control orientation, whereas the five self-grounded subscales would be related to autonomy orientation. It was also expected that the self-divided subscales would correlate with the impersonal motivational orientation of the GCOS, because, like the control orientation, the latter construct entails a lack of personal autonomy. To further examine these hypotheses, self-divided and self-grounded composite scores were again created in Study 3.

Study 3 also examined the content of participants' "personal strivings" (Emmons, 1986, 1989a)—that is, their characteristic, recurring goals. Whereas social awareness dispositions may be thought of as habitual patterns of *attending*, strivings may be thought of as habitual patterns of *intending*. In further accordance with the idea that self-divided persons are oriented toward external self-regulatory information, participants scoring high on these three subscales were expected to report more "self-presentational" strivings. That is, self-divided persons should be striving more to tailor themselves to others' opinions. One advantage of the open-ended personal striving approach is that it provides a more idiographic measure of motivation than the GCOS. To find converging results across goal and inventory methods, as Sheldon and Johnson (1993) did, would strengthen the case for the hypotheses being tested.

In sum, Study 3 attempted to relate the SAI's eight subscales and two factors to motivational variables. It was hypothesized that persons scoring high on the three self-divided subscales would evidence stronger control and impersonal orientation and would also list more self-presentational personal strivings. In contrast,

self-grounded people would evidence motivational autonomy.

Method

Participants were 167 undergraduates at the University of Rochester (62 men and 105 women) who participated for extra credit in a psychology class. Participants completed questionnaire packets during group test administrations.

During one group session, participants completed the GCOS (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). This measure consists of 12 scenarios covering a range of life situations, such as work and relationships. For each scenario, participants rated how likely it was that they would respond in three different ways, using a scale from 1, *not at all likely*, to 9, *extremely likely*. As an example, one scenario is "You are embarking on a new career. The most important consideration is likely to be:" The autonomous response option is "how interested you are in that kind of work," the controlled response is "whether there are good possibilities for advancement," and the impersonal response is "whether you can do the work without getting in over your head." Autonomy orientation, control orientation, and impersonal orientation scores were computed by summing the appropriate items across the 12 scenarios. Later in the packet, participants completed the Social Awareness Inventory also using a 9-point scale. Scores for the eight SAI subscales were computed by summing across the eight items in each. Self-divided and self-grounded composite scores were again created by summing the subscales that load on the respective factors.

In a later group session, participants listed 10 personal strivings (Emmons, 1986). Strivings were defined as "what you are typically or characteristically trying to do in the course of your everyday behavior." Participants were given examples of strivings such as "avoid people I don't like," "stay physically fit," and "make others like me" (see Emmons, 1989a, for a thorough discussion of the personal striving construct). Because participants did not have to attend every testing session, the sample size for the striving measure is somewhat smaller ($N = 137$).

Two trained undergraduate research assistants, blind to the hypotheses of the study, independently coded each participant's 10 strivings. Self-presentational strivings were defined as ones in which participants demonstrated concern for how others view them; examples include "I typically try to appear intelligent to others" and "I typically try to make myself physically attractive." Cohen's kappa, a measure of interrater agreement, was computed to be .81 between the two raters. The raters discussed and resolved their disagreements, with reference to the criteria given in the *Striving Coding Manual* (Emmons, n.d.). According to the raters' consensus,

participants gave a mean of 1.02 self-presentational strivings (out of 10), with a standard deviation of 1.13.

Results

Again, the reliabilities, pattern of means, and factor structure of the SAI subscales were examined. All alpha coefficients exceeded .73. Correlations between the subscales closely matched the pattern of Studies 1 and 2, and the Self-Grounded and Self-Divided factors again emerged strongly (see Table 3). Once again, the privileged/nonprivileged effect was seen; that is, there was a strong three-way interaction between the target, perspective, and content factors as predictors of subjects' awareness scores, $F(1, 166) = 128.06, p < .001$.⁷ The "self experience/from the self perspective" and "other's appearance/from the self perspective" subscales again had the highest means.

Table 6 presents the correlations between the eight SAI subscales and autonomy orientation, control orientation, impersonal orientation, and the number of self-presentational strivings listed by participants. As predicted, the five self-grounded subscales correlated significantly with autonomy orientation, and the three self-divided subscales correlated with both control orientation and impersonal orientation. In addition, autonomy orientation correlated negatively with the "self experience/from the other's perspective" subscale, and control orientation correlated positively with four of the five self-grounded subscales. Notably, this foursome included the four subscales assessing focal other-awareness and not the subscale assessing "self experience/from the self perspective." Thus these results may be consistent with the proposal that control orientation involves regulating oneself in accordance with environmental cues (Deci & Ryan, 1985a). Finally, Table 6 also shows that, as expected, scores on the three self-divided subscales were associated with the number of self-presentational personal strivings listed by subjects.

Turning to the relationship of the motivational variables and the two SAI factor composites, autonomy orientation was significantly associated with self-groundedness ($r = .38$) and not with self-division ($r = -.09$); control orientation was associated with both self-groundedness ($r = .25$) and self-division ($r = .39$); and impersonal orientation was not associated with self-groundedness ($r = .01$) but was associated with self-division ($r = .42$). The number of self-presentational strivings listed by participants was not associated with self-groundedness ($r = .01$) but was associated with self-division ($r = .40$).

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The SAI seems to provide a useful framework for conceptualizing and measuring social information-

TABLE 6: Correlations Between the Eight Subscales of the Social Awareness Inventory and Motivational Variables, Study 3

	<i>Self-Divided Awareness Forms</i>							
	<i>Self Exp/ Self Psp</i>	<i>Self Exp/ Other's Psp</i>	<i>Self App/ Self Psp</i>	<i>Self App/ Other's Psp</i>	<i>Other's Exp/ Self Psp</i>	<i>Other's Exp/ Other's Psp</i>	<i>Other's App/ Self Psp</i>	<i>Other's App/ Other's Psp</i>
Autonomy orientation	.46	-.27	.06	.00	.18	.30	.35	.17
Control orientation	.12	.21	.40	.37	.18	.18	.39	.30
Impersonal orientation	.01	.48	.26	.30	-.02	.04	.02	.00
Number of self-presentational personal strivings given	-.06	.34	.55	.38	.01	-.12	.10	.13

NOTE: Exp = experience; psp = perspective; app = appearance. For correlations involving motivational orientations: r greater than .15, $p < .05$; r greater than .20, $p < .01$. For correlations with number of self-presentational strivings: r greater than .16, $p < .05$; r greater than .22, $p < .01$.

processing styles. The eight SAI subscales showed acceptable internal consistency and related coherently to existing social awareness-related trait constructs. Results indicate that people high in private self-consciousness most characteristically focus on their own experience, as construed from their own evaluative perspective; those high in public self-consciousness focus on their own appearance, using both self and external perspectives; those high in social anxiety tend to focus on both self appearance and self experience as seen from external perspectives; narcissists focus on their own appearance, from their own perspective; and empaths (both emotional and cognitive) focus on both their own and others' experiences as seen from the experiencer's perspective.

Besides demonstrating potential as a framework in which to compare different constructs, the SAI also showed potential as a framework in which to examine different aspects of the *same* construct. There has been considerable disagreement over whether the Private Self-Consciousness Scale is bidimensional (Bernstein, Teng, & Garbin, 1986, and Britt, 1992, argued "no"; Burnkrant & Page, 1984, Mittal & Balusubramanian, 1987, and Piliavin & Charng, 1988, argued "yes"). The current results, replicated in two studies, suggest that the Private Self-Consciousness Scale is indeed two-faceted—its Internal State Awareness and Self-Reflective factors differ in the extent to which they involve taking an external perspective on one's private experience. Notably, Britt (1992) acknowledged that there may be theoretically meaningful reasons for partitioning the Private Self-Consciousness Scale and recommended that investigators with such reasons create new scales rather than continuing to argue over the structure of the old scale. The current research adopted this recommendation.

The Self-Grounded and Self-Divided SAI factors emerged in all three studies. The consistency of this two-factor structure with Duvall and Wicklund's (1972) groundbreaking concepts of subjective and objective self-awareness indicates that more recent efforts to differentiate social awareness theory (e.g., Figurski, 1987;

Sheldon & Johnson, 1993; Wegner & Giuliano, 1982) build reliably on earlier thinking in this area. The clean two-factor solution also supports Lamphere and Leary's (1990) finding that public and private aspects of the self are separate realms of experience rather than being polar extremes of the same dimension.

Study 3 explored the motivational concomitants of these two SAI factors to examine the claim that social awareness dispositions reflect enduring motivational or self-regulatory styles. Results indicate that people who employ self-divided awareness forms regulate themselves according to environmental controls and constraints (Deci & Ryan, 1985b) and also list more self-presentational personal strivings (Emmons, 1986). In contrast, people who employ self-grounded awareness forms are more oriented toward personal autonomy. Viewed in terms of cybernetic models of self-regulation, it may be that self-divided persons frequently engage in discrepancy reduction processes in which the evaluative standards employed are phenomenologically external to the felt self. To get information relevant to these alien reference standards, such persons may frequently employ awareness forms in which the self is objectified (Duvall & Wicklund, 1972). For example, someone who desires to gain others' approval may frequently simulate others' perspectives and then imagine herself or himself as seen from those external perspectives (e.g., "What do they think of what I just said?"). The purpose of such awarenesses, presumably, is to gain information with which to tailor and adjust one's social performance (Goffman, 1959).

However, overreliance on this strategy may have negative psychological health implications. Study 2 showed that self-divided people are prone to experience depression and to be high on neuroticism. Why might this be? Notably, in all three self-divided awareness forms, the self is the *focal target* of awareness. Thus the current findings echo the large literature linking dispositional self-focus to chronic negative affect (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). However, there is little consensus as yet on the

reasons for this linkage (Ingram, 1990; Wood et al., 1990).

The association of self-division with the controlled and impersonal motivational orientations (Deci & Ryan, 1985a) in Study 3 suggests one possible answer to this question, an answer not usually considered by self-awareness theorists. Deci and Ryan (1985b, 1991) propose that all people have an inherent psychological need for autonomy—that is, a need to feel a sense of choiceful selfhood (Ryan, 1995). Though only correlational, the results of the current research suggest that people who characteristically employ self-divided awareness forms may be failing to satisfy this organismic need (Plant & Ryan, 1985) and consequently may experience reduced psychological health and vitality. By habitually subjecting themselves to the contingent regard of phenomenologically alien frames of reference, self-divided people may sacrifice their autonomy; put differently, they may suffer from a condition in which “the other” has encroached too far into the sphere of the phenomenal self (Laing, 1969).

According to this view, the negative outcomes typically associated with dispositional self-focus (Ingram, 1990) do not result from the fact of self-focus per se but, rather, from the fact that, in many cases, chronically self-focused people pay too much attention to how others (real or imagined) would evaluate them. The current data indicate that habitual self-focus is harmless when it merely entails attending to one's private experience, using one's own values and perspectives. Presumably, people who frequently employ this “grounded” form of self-awareness do not thereby sacrifice their sense of personal autonomy.

One limitation of these studies is that only self-report data were collected. Thus the SAI's ability to predict behavioral outcomes has yet to be demonstrated (as noted before, however, the open-ended “personal striving” methodology of Study 3 involves a very different type of self-report than the inventory measures.) Another potential weakness is the high intercorrelations between some SAI subscales, which may reflect a lack of discriminant validity. For example, there may be little real difference between the disposition to be aware of self appearance from one's own perspective and the disposition to be aware of self appearance from the other's perspective. If so, it might be best to consider these two subscales only in combination, as joint indicators of self-division. A related ambiguity is that although existing personality constructs correlated as predicted with particular SAI subscales, these existing constructs were often related to nonpredicted SAI subscales as well. For example, narcissism was correlated with awareness of “self appearance from the self perspective,” as expected, but was also associated with several other SAI subscales. As another example, private self-consciousness

was most strongly associated with the “self experience from the self perspective” subscale but was also significantly correlated with the other subscales.

However, rather than indicating inadequate discriminativeness by the SIA, these patterns may be informative, revealing the inherent complexity of these existing constructs. For example, the Narcissistic Personality Inventory assesses seven different aspects of the trait (Raskin & Terry, 1988); given its multifaceted nature, perhaps it is not surprising that narcissism is associated with several social awareness dispositions. Private self-consciousness may be similarly complex, assessing, in part, a general disposition to be socially aware. If so, it may share some variance with all eight SAI subscales.

In fact, the evidence suggests that the SAI *itself* assesses (in part) such a “generalized social awareness disposition”; in all three studies, all eight subscales loaded substantially and positively on the largest (unrotated) factor. To the extent that a general factor contributes to each subscale, the distinctiveness of particular subscales might be weakened. Thus one way to improve the discriminativeness of the SAI subscales might be to remove or control for this general factor (e.g., Kasser & Ryan, 1996).

Exploratory analyses revealed that removing each subject's own 64-item mean from each of his or her 64 responses before computing the eight subscale scores indeed sharpened the discriminant correlational pattern of the SAI subscales with other constructs and simultaneously decreased the magnitude of these correlations. These results are not presented in this article because it seems premature to advocate removing a variance component from the SAI subscales that probably has substantive meaning (Hamilton, 1968) and also because this variance component is not removed from existing social awareness-related measures, in which it is also likely to inhere. Notably, only with a multidimensional inventory (such as the SAI) can such generalized response tendencies be isolated and then, perhaps, parialed out.

In sum, it will take further empirical work to establish the utility of the eight-cell distinction. Planned research will maintain the distinction, examining the particular modes of social awareness engendered when particular social goals and motives are adopted. However, investigators may also choose to focus on the two SAI factor composites instead of individual subscales. For example, research in progress is examining both main and interactive effects of dispositional and situational self-division on acquaintance-process outcomes. Doubtless, the correct focus (subscale level or factor level) depends on the particular questions being investigated.

In conclusion, it appears that the social awareness framework may allow fresh consideration of many constructs

and personality processes. More generally, the framework may be helpful in the task of bridging trait and motivational approaches to personality, an important concern for the 1990s (Emmons, 1989b; Read & Miller, 1989). These social information-processing dispositions may be construed as "intermediate" constructs, which partake of both what personality is and what personality does (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987).

Appendix

The Final 64 Items of the Social Awareness Inventory, with Recommended Item Ordering

Self experience/from the self perspective

3. I think quite a bit about how my experiences have shaped me into the person I am.
11. I reflect about myself and my inner motives a lot.
19. When something upsets me, I think a lot about why I got upset.
27. I always try to analyze why I feel a certain way.
35. To help myself become the person I want to be, I frequently reassess my reactions to things.
43. I am usually aware of how my emotions affect my actions.
51. I believe that I am a very self-reflective person.
59. I tend to stand back and evaluate my personal reactions to things.

Self experience/from the other's perspective

7. Sometimes I take my cue about what I should think and feel from others around me.
15. When my friends suggest how one ought to feel about something, I often end up feeling that way.
23. I often suppress my emotions when I'm afraid others won't approve of them.
31. I'm sometimes not quite sure if what I feel is acceptable, until I know someone else feels the same way.
39. I sometimes pay too much attention to other interpretations of what I'm feeling.
47. I feel uncomfortable if I know my values are different from those around me.
55. Sometimes I don't know what I'm feeling until somebody else tells me.
63. I usually conceal my emotions if I think the people I'm with won't accept them.

Self appearance/from the self perspective

4. I am quite self-conscious about my appearance, even if those I am with say I look fine.
12. I like looking at myself when I know I look good.
20. If I gain a few pounds, I can see the difference in my appearance even if nobody else can.
28. I sometimes think about my specific features, such as the shape of my nose or the sound of my voice.

36. My self-esteem suffers when I haven't met my own standards for grooming.

44. I expend a lot of thought on the clothes I wear.

52. I can only be happy when I feel that I am in shape.

60. I like to study myself in the mirror.

Self appearance/from the other's perspective

1. I frequently tailor the way I present myself according to who I am talking to.
9. I can't help but be aware of how others are judging me on the basis of how I look.
17. If I unexpectedly see someone I know, and I'm not dressed the way I usually am when I see them, I sometimes feel uncomfortable.
25. I like to know how I look to others.
33. I sometimes wonder what others would think if I had a different appearance.
41. If I think what I have on looks O.K., but my friends say they don't like it, I will frequently change my outfit.
49. I like to speculate about the impression I am making on others.
57. How I look to other people is important to me.

Other's experience/from the self perspective

8. I often try to come up with my own explanation for why people feel or think a certain way, rather than accepting theirs.
16. I can usually tell when another person is "overdramatizing" in their emotional responses to events.
24. I frequently see people whose emotions are being manipulated by others around them, but they don't know it.
32. I usually know how others feel, even if they don't know themselves.
40. I'm interested in others' experiences, because I try to figure out for myself what is going on with them.
48. I sometimes disagree with people's explanations for why they feel a certain way.
56. I often evaluate other people's feelings to determine whether they are justified.
64. It is usually easy for me to figure out why others feel the way they do.

Other's experience/from the other's perspective

2. I find it natural to identify with others' needs.
10. I can really put myself in other people's situations.
18. When talking to others I tend to get absorbed in their concerns, even if they are not my concerns.
26. I tend to empathize with other people's problems, even when I know they brought them upon themselves.
34. More than most, I can put myself in another's shoes.
42. When someone tells me about something that happened to them, it is as if I were totally in their world.
50. I can almost "become" other people when I'm listening to them.
58. I can get into another's experience even if I have never experienced anything similar.

Other's appearance/from the self perspective

5. When people lie to me, I often catch them because their voice and eyes give them away.
13. I can usually see right through people's "acts."
21. I tend to pay attention to the appearance or behavior of other people, from my own point of view.
29. I can figure out a lot about people just by watching them interact in social situations.
37. I like to observe and critique how others are acting in varying situations.
45. I can tell by the way a person carries him/herself whether he/she is being genuine.
53. I am alert to how other people manage their appearance.
61. I can usually tell from others' body language when they are trying to hide something from me.

Other's appearance/from the other's perspective

6. I can usually pick up the fact that a person is pleased about the way he/she looks.
14. I can tell what sort of image someone is trying to project.
22. When people who are overdressed walk into a party, I am aware of their uneasiness about how they look.
30. I often get a sense of how other people are evaluating themselves.
38. I can tell when someone is embarrassed about their accent or hairstyle.
46. I always catch it when someone is nervous about talking in front of groups of people.
54. It's not hard to pick up on other people's self-images.
62. I am often aware of another's self-consciousness about their appearance.

NOTES

1. Gollwitzer and Wicklund (1987) argued that public self-consciousness is not a form of self-awareness but, rather, a form of social dependency characterized by oversensitivity to the opinions of others. In contrast, Carver and Scheier (1987) argued that public self-consciousness is in fact a form of self-awareness, because it does entail that the person thinks about himself or herself (albeit from a phenomenologically external vantage point). Concurring with the latter view, the model being introduced herein would define public self-consciousness as a form of self-awareness, because the self is the focal target of a publicly self-conscious person's awareness.

2. Thus personality traits are herein viewed as being, in part, the surface manifestations of deeper-lying motives and configurations of motives (Alston, 1970; Emmons, 1989b; Read & Miller, 1989). In line with the assumption that they help people enact goals, social awareness traits may be seen as manifesting the "how" of motivated behavior, more so than the "what" or the "why" (Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996).

3. Importantly, social awarenesses need not be veridical representations of another's evaluative perspective or experience; veridicality is a separate issue (Figurski, 1987).

4. The Internal State Awareness score was formed by summing Items 3, 13, 20, and 22 (numbers refer to the original 23-item scale); alpha for this 4-item composite was .57. The Self-Reflectiveness score was formed by summing Items 1, 5, 7, 9, 15, and 18 (alpha = .63).

5. A reviewer correctly pointed out that these raw subscale means are not truly commensurate, given that the difficulties of the items within each subscale, relative to the latent trait they are meant to assess,

are probably unequal. Nevertheless, patterns of means are presented in this study, because it is of interest to examine their convergence with Sheldon and Johnson's (1993) findings. Because Sheldon and Johnson used systematically varied single-item definitional statements as stimuli, their awareness form means were directly comparable to each other.

6. The reader may wonder whether men and women differed in their mean levels of the various awareness forms. No consistent pattern of sex differences emerged across these three studies, and therefore no results involving gender are presented.

7. As a reminder, this effect merely reflects the fact that it is more "natural" to consider a person's experience from that person's own perspective and to consider a person's appearance from an external perspective. This three-way interaction has been presented throughout this article to show consistency of these results with those of Sheldon and Johnson (1993); however, the distinction is likely to be of limited substantive interest.

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